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ABSTRACT 
 
S. BRANDON FANNEY:  THE EFFECT OF ONE-AND-DONE  PLAYERS ON 
DIVISION I MEN’S COLLEGE BASKETBALL PROGRAMS 
Under the direction of Barbara Osborne J.D. 
 
In 2006, the NBA instituted a rule that required players to be one year removed from 
high school before they were eligible to enter the NBA draft.  As a result, many of the 
nation’s top high school basketball players decided to play NCAA Division I college 
basketball for one season, until they could enter the draft.  These players became known as 
one-and-dones and this study was created to determine their impact on college basketball.  
Their impact was measured with five variables: winning percentage, NCAA tournament 
games, attendance, merchandise sales, and roster turnover.  Of the five variables only NCAA 
tournament games was found to be significantly different with a one-and-done player.  
However, because of the popularity and importance of the NCAA tournament, it can be 
concluded that one-and-done players have had a significant effect on Division I Men’s 
College Basketball Programs. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 In 2006, the National Basketball Association instituted an age limit stating a player is 
not eligible for the NBA draft until one year after his graduating class.  Before this rule was 
instituted, many players elected to forego college and declare for the NBA draft straight out 
of high school.  Since 1995, when Kevin Garnett became the first modern player to go 
straight from high school to the NBA, forty-seven high school players have attempted to 
make the jump (The draft review, 2008).  However, the NBA’s age limit means that now “the 
great high school players have little choice but to do time in college for a season at a high-
profile college” (Rhoden, 2008, ¶6).  
  Consequently, the age limit has caused a rapid increase in the number of college 
basketball players deciding to leave school after their freshman year.  In the two years that 
the NBA age limit has been in place, twenty-one college freshmen have declared for the 
draft; by comparison, only twenty-seven college freshmen declared for the draft in the eleven 
years preceding the NBA age limit. (The draft review, 2008)  This new dynamic has greatly 
impacted college basketball and has created what is known as the one-and-done player, who 
comes to college only intending to stay for one year.  College coaches must now decide if it 
is worth the risk to recruit the elite high school players who will most likely only be at their 
university for one season.  One theory is that having an elite freshman, even only for a year, 
can elevate a college basketball program both on and off the court. A one-and-done superstar 
can lead a team to prominence, attracting new fans and revenue streams.  On the other hand, 
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losing your best player after only one year could cause a lack of cohesion and ultimately set a 
program back.  The presence of one-and-done players might deter future recruits from 
joining a program, because of the threat of a sharp decline in talent or the potential lack of 
playing time.        
Before the age limit, college coaches had a good understanding as to which 
athletes were most likely to make the jump to the NBA…Now college 
coaches are faced with a new challenge; deciding whether to add high-caliber 
athletes that will bolt after one year, or signing players with less stature that 
are intent at receiving a college degree (McGrath, 2007, ¶8).   
In addition, one-and-done players often have little interest in going to college.  As Brandon 
Jennings, an incoming freshmen who initially signed to play at the University of Arizona, 
pointed out,  
College is like, OK, we’ll do this one year, but our real mind-set is that we’re 
trying to get to the league, take care of our families.  They’re making us do 
college so we feel like, let’s do one year, go to class half the time (Infante, 
2008, ¶6).   
Some one-and-done players may adopt even more hostile feelings towards their universities.   
The coach receives adulation, the university receives tournament money, the 
nonrevenue sports receive funding. What does an elite player get? An ‘extra 
benefit’ could land the program on probation and have the player declared 
ineligible.  You can’t say the player receives a free education because he is 
leaving after a year (Rhoden, 2008, ¶ 9).  
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This type of thinking could be cancerous to a team.  Coaches have to decide if it is worth the 
risk to bring in supremely talented one-and-done players, who may only be looking out for 
their own best interests.   
The increasing number of one-and-done players may also force universities to re-
examine their missions.   
After all, that is the purpose of attending a university, to attain a higher 
education.  With the arrival of highly talented athletes that have no intention 
of staying past their freshman year, the title student-athlete begins to hold 
little legitimacy (McGrath, 2007, ¶9).   
“University presidents are forced to sit back and watch 18-year-olds make the college 
institution merely a stepping-stone to fame and riches in the NBA” (McGrath, ¶10). Does 
compromising the integrity of higher learning guarantee extra wins on the court and 
additional revenue for the athletic department?  Can a university compete in the new era of 
college basketball without one-and-done players? 
 This study attempts to examine these issues by considering the success of the 
university’s basketball program in the seasons immediately before and after a one-and-done 
player, as well as the success of the university during the season with a one-and-done player.   
Program success includes both on and off-court success.  On-court success is determined 
from (a) team’s regular season winning percentage and (b) number of NCAA tournament 
games in which the team played. The team’s annual regular-season winning percentage gives 
a standard of comparison that is not affected by the number of games the team played, which 
varies from season to season and from team to team. The number of games played in the 
NCAA tournament also offers a measure of success for the teams that would remain 
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constant.  The number of NCAA tournament games played is also a determinant of the 
monetary rewards received from the NCAA for postseason performance.  Therefore, number 
of NCAA tournament games is useful when looking at a program’s off-court success in terms 
of revenue generation.   The program’s off-court success is additionally derived from (a) 
attendance, the percentage of stadium capacity for team’s home games and (b) the amount of 
revenue generated by the team’s merchandise sales. Reporting attendance as a percentage of 
total stadium capacity attempts to eliminate any discrepancies in stadium size between 
universities and give a more accurate comparison.  Measuring merchandise sales in terms of 
revenue dollars nullifies price variations between products and universities.   One final 
variable, percentage of roster turnover is used to analyze if having one-and-done players may 
be related to the composition of college basketball teams.  
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Statement of purpose 
 The purpose of this study is to determine the effect that one-and-done college 
basketball players have on the success of college basketball programs in terms of (a) regular 
season winning percentage, (b) NCAA tournament games played, (c) attendance, (d) 
merchandise sales, and (e) roster turnover. 
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Research questions 
 When compared to their peers, is there a significant difference in the success of men’s 
college basketball programs at identified colleges or universities in the seasons before, during 
which, and after one-and-done players compete for such universities as measured by the 
following variables: 
1. winning percentage, 
2. number of NCAA tournament games played, 
3. attendance, 
4. merchandise sales, and  
5. roster turnover? 
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Research hypotheses 
 At identified “one-and-done” colleges or universities, there will be a significant 
difference between the men’s basketball programs’ success during one-and-done players’ 
careers and the programs’ success in the year before and after the players’ careers. However, 
there will not be a significant difference between the success of college basketball programs 
before a one-and-done player’s career and the success of college basketball programs after a 
one-and-done player’s career.  At peer schools, the basketball programs’ success will remain 
unchanged regardless of season.   
 
1.  One-and-done programs’ winning percentages will increase significantly from 
the season before a one-and-done player to the season with a one-and-done 
player.  The season after a one-and-done player, the programs’ winning 
percentages will decrease by the same significant amount.  Peer programs’ 
winning percentages will be unchanged over the course of the study. 
2. For one-and-done programs, the number of NCAA tournament games played will 
increase significantly from the season before a one-and-done player to the season 
with a one-and-done player.  The season after a one-and-done player, the NCAA 
tournament games played will decrease by the same significant amount.  For peer 
programs, the number of NCAA tournament games played will remain consistent 
for all three seasons. 
 
3. Attendance will increase significantly from the season before a one-and-done 
player to the season with a one-and-done player for one-and-done programs.  
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Attendance will not significantly change from the season with a one-and-done 
player to the season after a one-and-done player, as the one-and-done programs 
will enjoy continued success based on the previous season with the one-and-done 
player.  It is expected that there will be no significant change in the attendance at 
peer programs over the same period of time. 
4. At one-and-done institutions, merchandise sales will increase significantly from 
the season before a one-and-done player to the season with a one-and-done 
player.  Merchandise sales will not significantly change from the season with a 
one-and-done player to the season after a one-and-done player, as the one-and-
done school will experience a carry-over effect.  Merchandise sales at peer 
institutions will not fluctuate significantly in any of the three seasons. 
5. The percentage of roster turnover will be higher for the season after a one-and-
done player than in either of the other two seasons for one-and-done schools.  
There will be no difference in the percentage of roster turnover for peer schools 
during the seasons. 
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Delimitations 
This study analyzes players who left college after one season beginning in 1995.  This 
year was chosen because 1995 was the first year since 1975 that a player elected to bypass 
college and go straight to the NBA from high school.  This trend became increasingly 
popular, and forty-seven high school players were selected in the NBA Draft been 1995 and 
2006. (The Draft Review, 2008)  In 2007, the NBA age limit went into effect, and high 
school players were no longer able to go straight to the NBA from high school.  As a result, 
many of these players elected to play college basketball for one year, until they were eligible 
for the NBA draft.  By analyzing the players from 1995 until the present, this study 
accurately represents the impact of one-and-done players on the changing climate in college 
basketball. 
Some players who left college after their freshmen seasons were not included in this 
study.  Stephen Jackson attended Butler Community College for one year before entering the 
NBA Draft.  Community Colleges are not governed by the NCAA and information on the 
program’s performance was not readily available.  Additionally, players who left school after 
one year but were not drafted by an NBA team were also not included in this study.  Those 
players were assumed to have not made a significant impact on their college program, since 
they were not talented enough to be drafted by an NBA team. 
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Limitations 
 This study was limited by the number of subjects available for analysis. Since 1995, 
forty-eight players have been drafted by a NBA team after their freshmen year of college. 
While this number may seem relatively small, the fact that twenty-one of these one-and-done 
players entered the draft in the two years since the NBA instituted its age limit suggests that 
the one-and-done phenomenon is an increasing trend.  The thirteen freshmen eligible for the 
2008 NBA draft were included in this study, but because statistics were not available on their 
programs’ performances for the season following their departure, they were only used to 
measure roster turnover.  
This study’s effectiveness was also limited by the ability to gain all the necessary 
information about the programs which had one-and-done athletes.  While winning percentage 
and NCAA tournament games played were readily available statistics, it was more difficult to 
get ticket and merchandise sales for less recent seasons.  Therefore, incomplete data were not 
used in the analysis. 
This study was unable to address the question of whether one-and-done players also 
impact college basketball programs by hurting the institution’s academic standing with the 
NCAA.  John Calipari, head basketball coach at the University of Memphis, noted “that the 
demands of the NCAA academic reform legislation, and eventual penalties for schools whose 
players do not progress toward degrees, will add pressure to decisions on potential one-year 
players”  (Moran, 2005, ¶8)   
Coaches now have to weigh the pros and cons of adding a "one and done" 
player to their roster and whether a deep run in March is worth the possible 
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retributions from the NCAA when graduation rates fall below par (McGrath, 
2007, ¶9).  
However, because the NBA’s age limit has only been in place for two seasons, it was not 
possible to see the effect that one-and-done players have on programs’ graduation rates.  
While Academic Progress Rates (APR), do offer a snapshot of a basketball team’s academic 
standing, the numbers are reported collectively as a team, so it was not possible to distinguish 
the effect of one-and-done players from the rest of the team. 
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Assumptions 
For the purposes of this study, it was assumed that: 
• Attendance information provided by universities was accurate. 
• A team played a schedule of equal strength for the three years observed. 
• Other factors like coaching changes and new arenas had minimal effect on the 
dependent variables. 
• Members of the teams, other than the one-and-done player, were of comparable skill 
for the three years observed. 
• Merchandise offerings for the teams were equivalent for the three years observed. 
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Definition of Terms 
• Attendance:  In one season, the actual number of tickets sold by a team for its home 
games, divided by the maximum number of tickets that could have been sold for its 
home games. 
• Merchandise sales:  In one season, the monetary value of merchandise sales for a 
team, expressed in dollars. 
• NBA (National Basketball Association):  The top professional basketball league in 
the world with 30 teams in the United States and Canada. 
• NBA draft:   An annual event, where NBA teams are allowed to select new players 
from the pool of eligible entrants from United States colleges and other professional 
leagues.  
• NCAA (National Collegiate Athletic Association):  The major governing body of 
intercollegiate athletics in the United States. 
• NCAA tournament: An annual sixty-five team tournament that determines the 
national championship for NCAA men’s college basketball. 
• NCAA tournament games:  In one NCAA tournament, the number of basketball 
games that a particular team participated in. 
• One-and-done player:  An elite basketball player who plays one season of college 
basketball before becoming a professional basketball player in the NBA. 
• Peer institution/school:  A university in the same athletic conference that has many 
factors in common with a university that has had a one-and-done basketball player.  
These factors include total enrollment, total number of varsity sports offered, regular 
season men’s basketball winning percentage, and annual athletic department budget. 
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• Program:  Everything encompassed by a university’s men’s basketball team; 
including but not limited to coaches, players, university basketball facilities, games, 
and revenues and expenses. 
• Roster turnover:  The number of new players on a team divided by the total number 
of players on that same team for any given season. 
• Success:   Determined by five different statistics that evaluate a college basketball 
programs performance:  winning percentage, NCAA tournament games, attendance, 
merchandise sales, and roster turnover.  
• Winning percentage:  In one regular season, the number of games won by a team 
divided by the total number of games that same team played. 
15 
 
Significance of the study 
 The findings of this study may aid college basketball coaches in their recruitment of 
high school players.  This study will help to provide a clearer picture of the effect that a one-
and-done player has on a college basketball program.  It could show that a program may 
benefit significantly during the one season that the player is on the team, but those benefits 
disappear as soon as the player leaves.  Alternatively, it could show that having a one-and-
done player actually elevates the program’s status in the future as well as the present.  
Conversely, it could show that a one-and-done player’s departure leaves the program in a 
bind, and that an erosion of success occurs.  The actual findings may help coaches decide if it 
is worth the risk of recruiting a highly skilled prospect that is likely to only play college 
basketball for one year before making the jump to the NBA. 
 Athletics directors may also find this information useful when they look to hire 
basketball coaches.  They can refer to this study and compare its findings with the practices 
of potential candidates.  If athletic directors know that one-and-done players tend to hurt 
programs in the long run, they may want to avoid candidates who have a history of recruiting 
those players.  Conversely, if they want an immediate boost in their program, they may want 
to hire a coach who has successfully signed several one-and-done players.  Either way, 
athletic directors can use the findings of this study to help the direction of their basketball 
programs objectively. 
 In terms of future research, the findings of this study could also beneficial when 
considering the issue of paying collegiate athletes.  Those in favor of paying the athletes 
argue that the players bring in huge amounts of revenue for their athletic departments, but 
receive severely inadequate compensation in a full scholarship (Wertheim 2007, ¶46).  If this 
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study shows one-and-done players significantly increase a school’s revenue associated with 
NCAA tournament games, ticket sales, and merchandise sales, it would strengthen the 
argument that college athletes deserve to be compensated beyond a full scholarship.  
Conversely, if it is shown that one-and-done players do not significantly increase revenue, 
then this argument would be weakened because it can be said that the fans attend to support 
the university team rather than any individual athlete.  In other words, the name on the front 
of the jersey is more important than the name on the back of it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER II 
 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
Introduction 
 
 This study examines the impact of the one-and-done basketball players on NCAA 
college basketball.  These elite players played NCAA college basketball for only one season 
before entering the NBA draft.  In order to fully understand the issue, a brief history of the 
NBA and the NBA draft is provided.  Then, a discussion on the potential impact of one-and-
done players on college basketball programs is derived from previous research.  Much of this 
research pertains to professional sports. However, the research is still applicable to this study 
as men’s college basketball teams generate revenue for the NCAA and athletic departments, 
in the same manner that professional teams generate revenue for their leagues and individual 
team owners.   Finally, this section concludes with an analysis of the differing opinions 
concerning the impact of the NBA age limit on other parties.
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 History of NBA and NBA Draft 
 The NBA began in 1946, when the owners of major ice hockey arenas in the 
Northeast and Midwest United States decided to form a professional basketball league 
(History of the NBA, 2008, ¶1).  Despite the presence of other professional Basketball 
leagues, the NBA gradually evolved into what is today considered world’s premiere 
basketball league.  One area of transition for the NBA has been the introduction of new 
players into the league through its annual draft.   
 When the NBA draft originated in 1947, many teams were struggling to develop loyal 
fan bases in their communities (Evolution of the draft and lottery, 2008, ¶1).  In an effort to 
counter, before the draft even started the league “allowed a team to forfeit its first-round pick 
and select a player from its immediate area, presumably with a strong local following” 
(Evolution of the draft and lottery, 2008, ¶1).  The draft continued in this manner until 1966.  
At that time, the league instituted a policy of flipping a coin between the last place teams in 
each division to decide who got the first overall pick in the draft; the rest of the teams picked 
in opposite order of their won-lost records (Evolution of the draft and lottery, 2008, ¶3). 
 The modern NBA draft began to take shape in 1985, when the NBA created the 
lottery system.  Under the lottery system, all teams that did not make the league’s playoffs 
had their first round draft order determined by a random drawing, with each team having an 
equal chance of receiving the first overall pick (Evolution of the draft and lottery, 2008, ¶7).  
Just two years later, the league modified the lottery format so that only the first three picks 
were determined in the drawing and the remaining lottery picks were assigned according to 
won-lost records (Evolution of the draft and lottery, 2008, ¶10).  Then in 1990, the NBA 
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adjusted the lottery to a weighted system; thereby giving teams with the worst records a 
better chance to win one of the first three picks. 
 Selection order was not the only change in the NBA draft over the years.  The size of 
the draft itself has changed numerous times.  When the draft first began, teams simply kept 
picking players until they ran out of prospects (Evolution of the draft and lottery, 2008, ¶12).  
It was shortened to twenty-one rounds in 1960, then to ten in 1974, and again to seven in 
1985; finally in 1989, the draft was condensed to its current two-round version (Evolution of 
the draft and lottery, 2008, ¶12).  With the thirty teams currently in the NBA, there are a total 
of sixty players selected annually in the NBA draft. 
 In the 2005-2006 collective bargaining agreement between the league and the players 
union, the NBA instituted an age limit, which changed the number of players eligible for its 
draft.  In order to be eligible for the NBA draft, players had be at least 19 years old and one 
year removed from high school (McGrath, 2008, ¶3).  This meant that starting in 2006 
players would no longer be able to go straight from high school to the NBA.  Instead, they 
had to pursue other options like playing in the NBA Developmental League, playing 
internationally, or playing college basketball for at least one year. 
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NBA Draft Eligibility 
 In 1975, the Philadelphia 76ers used the fifth pick in NBA Draft to select Darryl 
Dawkins out of Maynard Evans High School in Orlando, Florida (The draft review, 2008).  
Dawkins was the first player to ever go to straight from high school to the NBA.  That same 
year, the Atlanta Hawks selected high-schooler Bill Willoughby in the second round (The 
draft review).   It was twenty years until another high school basketball player, Kevin 
Garnett, decided to bypass college and declare for the NBA draft.  Garnett’s decision turn 
professional was controversial, and many questioned if a high school player was emotionally 
and physically mature enough to endure the grind of the NBA (The best thing for me, 1999, 
¶11). 
 However, once Garnett made the jump many other elite high school players began to 
skip college and declare for the NBA draft.  From 1995 to 2006, forty-seven high school 
players were selected in the NBA draft (The draft review, 2008).  Along with Kevin Garnett, 
this group also included future NBA stars like Kobe Bryant, Lebron James, Dwight Howard, 
Jermaine O’Neal, and Tracy McGrady.  Some argued that this trend robbed college 
basketball of marquee talent and depleted the college game.  As Mike DeCourcy of The 
Sporting News pointed out in 2006, it became fashionable to enter the NBA draft early, and 
increasingly younger and less developed players elected to forego college eligibility to 
pursue their professional careers.  The net effect was that NCAA college basketball suffered 
a mass exodus of talent that left its products somewhat diluted (DeCourcy, 2006). 
College basketball was not the only institution hurt by this epidemic; many NBA 
teams invested millions of dollars in high school players who never developed in the NBA.  
Michael Schwartz (2007) pointed out, “For every Kobe Bryant there's a Korleone Young, for 
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every Kevin Garnett a Leon Smith, and for every Amare Stoudemire a Kendrick Perkins” ( 
¶1).  Since 1995, nine players declared for the NBA draft straight out of high school, only to 
go undrafted and never make the league; another eight high school players were drafted but 
are already out of the NBA (The draft review, 2008).  Roughly thirty-six percent of the high 
school players who entered the NBA draft from 1995 to 2006 never developed into NBA 
players.  These young men never realized their potential, and NBA teams had little to show 
for the money they invested in them. 
 In 2006, the NBA instituted an age limit.  By requiring players to be 19 years old and 
at least one year removed from high school, the league hoped to prevent players from making 
the mistake of turning professional before they were ready, and also hoped that its teams 
would benefit from drafting more mature, developed basketball players who had an extra 
year of basketball experience (McGrath, 2007, ¶4).  Since 2006, almost all of the elite players 
who might have gone to the NBA straight out of high school have chosen to hone their skills 
in NCAA college basketball.  As DeCourcy (2005) suggested when analyzing a one-and-
done prospect O.J. Mayo, “college crowds would be larger, the pressure greater, the 
opposition more sophisticated.  Opponents have time to scout you in college.  For Mayo to 
become the best player he can be, he needs that” (¶11) Mayo did elect to go to college at the 
University of Southern California, and like many contemporary stars, he decided to enter the 
NBA draft after his freshman season.  From 1995 to 2006, twenty-seven freshmen were 
drafted; since 2006, twenty-one freshmen have been drafted. (The draft review, 2008)   
 The net result has been an increase the number of talented players in college 
basketball, even if only for one season.  Leonard (2006) contends the year of college 
basketball allows players to mature both physically and mentally, which increases their 
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likelihood of having a successful NBA career.  Conversely, it also denies them of one year of 
potential multi-million dollar earnings.  The age limit improves the NCAA’s talent, which 
makes the game more popular and thereby more profitable; in contrast, it denies one-and-
done players financial benefit and offers little in exchange (Leonard, p. 168).  This study 
attempted to quantify the financial implications of one-and-done players by determining the 
revenue they generate for their schools in terms of increased NCAA tournament games, 
attendance, and merchandise sales. 
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Potential Impact of NBA Age Limit on NCAA College Basketball 
 The NBA age limit has created a trend in college basketball known as the one-and-
done, when an elite high school player comes to college for only the one required season 
before leaving for the NBA.  This trend has forced college coaches to consider the pros and 
cons of recruiting elite talent that they will only have for one season.   
College basketball teams generate revenue from ticket sales, television contracts, and 
merchandise sales (Wimmer, 2002, ¶1).  Since television contracts are usually set by the 
conference office for an extended period of time, this study analyzed only attendance and 
merchandise sales.  These can both be impacted by one-and-done players.  In 2005, 
Braunstein and Zhang studied the relationship between athletic star power and Generation Y 
sports consumption.  They determined the factors of professional trustworthiness, likeable 
personality, athletic expertise, social attractiveness, and characteristic style were predictive of 
sport consumption of Generation Y consumers.  As Braunstein and Zhang noted, “an 
athlete’s position in the public eye offers him/her the opportunity to exert referent power due 
to his/her ability to make others want to be like him/her or be associated with him/her” (p. 
243).   In college basketball, a large percentage of a team’s fan base is made up of the 
university’s student body, members of Generation Y.  These students can associate with a 
player on the team by purchasing tickets to his team’s games or by buying merchandise like 
his jersey.   Therefore, this study examined the impact of one-and-done players on both 
attendance and merchandise sales. 
In 1974, Roger G. Noll attempted to determine the factors that influenced fan 
attendance at Major League Baseball games.  Noll used t-tests to calculate the effects of local 
population, income, ticket price, stadium age, and number of star players, team quality, black 
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population, team batting average, team earned run average, annual sunny days, and league on 
attendance for the 1970 & 1971 baseball seasons.  He found that team quality, ticket price, 
number of star players, population, black population, stadium age, and per capita income 
were all significant factors in determining attendance (Noll, 1974, p. 122-7). Because this 
study seeks to determine potential impact of one-and-done players, of the factors Noll found 
to be significant, only team quality and the number of star players on the team are relevant. 
Therefore, the other factors were not considered in this study. 
 Other studies have suggested the mere presence of star players is not enough to affect 
spectator attendance.  In 2002, Rivers and DeSchriver formulated a study on the effect of star 
players and payroll distribution on Major League Baseball (MLB) attendance.  To determine 
this effect, they created a multiple regression economic demand model that measured the 
relationship between seventeen explanatory variables and the dependent variable, spectator 
attendance.  Ultimately, the model explained 83.64 percent of the variation in attendance at 
MLB games, and eight of the seventeen explanatory variables were found to be statistically 
significant at the 0.05 alpha- level (Rivers & DeSchiver, p. 171). 
Interestingly, the presence of a star player who did not contribute to better on-field 
performance was not statistically significant in determining spectator attendance (Rivers & 
DeSchiver, 2002).  For this reason, it was necessary to determine the effect of one-and-done 
players on teams’ on-court success, measured in terms of winning percentage and NCAA 
tournament games played in this study.  
In Rivers and DeSchriver’s study, the number of years since a team’s last playoff 
appearance was found to be statistically significant in determining attendance (2002).  
Therefore, a college basketball program that has not made the NCAA tournament for a 
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number of years may want to consider recruiting a one-and-done player in attempt to make 
the postseason.  Perhaps, playing in the NCAA tournament with a one-and-done player could 
increase a basketball program’s attendance even after the player leaves.  To measure the 
effect of postseason play, this study included the number of NCAA tournament games played 
by a team in the season before, the season with, and the season after a one-and-done player. 
 Even if a one-and-done player elevated a team for one year, he may not have a long-
term positive impact on a men’s basketball program.  In 1997, Kahane and Shmanske studied 
the effect of roster turnover on attendance in Major League Baseball.  They calculated roster 
turnover as the percentage of players on a team who played in 60 percent of the team’s 
games in a season and were not on the team’s roster the following season.  The study also 
looked at the effect of winning percentage, income, population, a new stadium, and ticket 
price had on spectator attendance.  Winning percentage, income, population, and a new 
stadium were all found to have a positive impact on attendance.  Conversely, ticket price and 
roster turnover were found to have a negative effect on attendance.  For every percentage 
point of roster turnover, a team lost 0.72 percent in average attendance  (Kahane, 1997).  
Kahane and Shmanske theorized that if fans are not familiar with the players on the team, 
then they do not enjoy the game as much and, therefore, do not attend as often.   
If roster turnover has the same negative effect on college basketball attendance, then 
programs may want to consider this when recruiting one-and-done players.  Fans of the team 
have little time to become familiar with one-and-done players and this could in turn have a 
negative impact on attendance.  This study noted the percentage roster turnover associated 
with one-and-done players and sought to discover the relationship of such roster turnover to 
changes in attendance for the seasons before, with, and after a one-and-done player.  It also 
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investigated the relationship of teams’ winning percentages to the presence of a one-and-
done player.  As noted by Kahane and Shmanske, losing a productive player and failure to 
replace that player with an equally productive player resulted in decreased winning 
percentage and consequently, decreased attendance (1997).  Therefore, this study tried to 
determine if a team’s winning percentage drops the season following a one-and-done player.  
Kahane and Shmanske’s factors of income, population, a new stadium, and ticker price will 
not be used in this study because they are all beyond the control of one-and-done players. 
In 2008 Morse, Shapiro, McEvoy and Rascher published a similar study that sought 
to explain the effects of roster turnover on attendance in the National Basketball Association 
(NBA).  This study looked at roster turnover as a percentage of team salary as well as a 
percentage of players.  This was done in an attempt to estimate the quality of the players 
leaving the team (Morse et al., 2008).  Ultimately, Morse et al. determined that neither roster 
turnover variable significantly altered spectator attendance at NBA games, provided the team 
continued to have on-court success.  If the same holds true for college basketball, then a 
team’s attendance may not decline with the departure of a one-and-done player and roster 
turnover would not significantly affect college basketball programs’ off-court success. 
However, the challenge for a college men’s basketball coach becomes finding a way 
to maintain the level of on-court success after the loss of a one-and-done player.  A program 
may experience a surge in attendance and merchandise sales with a one-and-done player, but 
risk losing those benefits if it does not keep winning after that player leaves.  Therefore, 
coaches looking for a quick fix for their program may want to recruit one-and-done players, 
while those looking to build long term may be better off recruiting players who will stay in 
college longer and improve gradually. 
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Other Potential Impacts of the NBA Age Limit 
 College programs are not the only ones who have been affected by the NBA age 
limit.  NBA teams, as well as NBA players, have had to adapt.  Many NBA teams say that 
the emergence of one-and-done players has made player evaluation and drafting strategy 
much more difficult.  One NBA general manager said,  
These players used to come out of high school or even after two years of 
college.  Now the rule is that they have to play one year of college, and that’s 
what a lot of them are doing.  We aren’t allowed to watch them in high school 
anymore and so we’re trying to judge them based on one year of college.  It’s 
not enough. Not being able to watch the high school players is really hurting 
us.  Otherwise, we’d all have better knowledge (Thomsen, 2008, ¶5). 
The age limit was designed to help NBA teams, but this comment appears to indicate that the 
rule is having the opposite effect. 
 The rule also may as have had an effect on revenue in NCAA basketball.  In an effort 
to determine the revenue generated by one-and-done players, this study looks at teams’ 
postseason success (NCAA tournament games), ticket sales, and merchandise sales.  If teams 
generated significantly more revenue with one-and-done players than without them, then it 
can be argued that these elite athletes are responsible for the increase.  “The players that are 
leaving early for the pros are the ones generating a lot of revenue,” (Wimmer, 2002, ¶9) and, 
“You can’t say the player receives a free education because he is leaving after a year” 
(Rhoden, 2008, ¶9). 
 Others argue that one-and-done players receive other compensation from for their one 
year stint as a college student.  They receive one year of high-quality instruction that 
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improves both their basketball technique and physical abilities.  The NCAA itself notes such 
basketball tutelage helps these players prepare for their futures as professional athletes 
(NCAA – Press Room – Current Issues, 2008, ¶5).  Additionally, the one-and-done players 
receive invaluable exposure as they play in nationally televised games and gain notoriety 
with basketball fans (King 2008).  Jason King depicted this phenomenon when he compared 
Kansas State’s Michael Beasley and USC’s O.J. Mayo to Dwight Howard, who turned pro 
straight out of high school.  King noted while Howard was just as talented as Beasley and 
Mayo, it took him years to establish the same name recognition that the other two already 
possessed from playing just one year of college basketball (2008, ¶25).  This name 
recognition could in turn lead to major sponsorship dollars, which would not have been 
available to those players if they had not played college basketball for one season.  
Therefore, it could be argued that one-and-done players benefit financially as do the colleges 
and coaches that they play for.   
 Opponents to the NBA age limit have started to look for alternatives to playing 
college basketball.  Brandon Jennings, the number one rated point guard coming out of high 
school in 2008, originally committed to play basketball at the University of Arizona.  
Recently, Jennings announced that he had changed his mind and instead decided to sign a 
contract to play professional basketball in Europe for the one year that he is required to wait 
before he is eligible for the NBA draft (Whitlock, 2008, ¶13).  This could be the beginning of 
a new trend, where one-and-done players realize their immediate earning potential in other 
leagues and again elect to skip college all together.   
This is just another instance of the college athletics version of the inevitable 
law of unintended consequences.  By creating a rule to prevent a viable and 
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lucrative career choice for superstar high school basketball players, the NBA 
and NCAA may have unwittingly paved the way to Europe for high schoolers 
who don’t want to – or cannot – wait a year (Infante, 2008, ¶7). 
If this becomes a reality, then college coaches and administrators may once again have to re-
evaluate their programs and recruiting ideology. 
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Conclusion 
The developments of the NBA and the NBA draft have had a direct impact on NCAA 
college basketball.  When the NBA instituted an age limit in 2006, it resulted in a huge 
increase in the number of players who went to college for only one season.  Before the age 
limit rule was in effect, many of these one-and-done players elected to declare for the NBA 
draft straight out of high school, bypassing college all together.  This has created a dilemma 
for NCAA college basketball programs.  Is it beneficial to have a star player, who only plays 
for one season?  Drawing from previous research, this study attempted to measure the one-
and-done player’s impact on the program by looking at winning percentage, NCAA 
tournament games played, attendance, merchandise sales, and roster turnover for the teams 
with and without the one-and-done players.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter III 
METHODOLOGY 
Methods 
 The method of research for this study was to collect information from pre-existing 
databases.  This study collected statistics regarding winning percentage, NCAA tournament 
games played, attendance, merchandise sales, and roster turnover for the season before, the 
season with, and the season after a one-and-done college basketball player.   The website for 
each university that has had a one-and-done player from 1995-2007 was searched for 
archived statistics (most basketball media guides contain these data).  If the information was 
not available through the website, then the sports information director (or an athletic 
administrator who serves this role) was contacted directly regarding winning percentages, 
NCAA tournament games played, attendance, and rosters for the seasons pertaining to this 
study.  An athletics business manager or ticket sales director was contacted for ticket sales 
data as needed.  Merchandise sales were identified through the Collegiate Licensing 
Company (CLC). 
 Additionally, the same data were collected for a peer institution that did not have a 
one-and-done player during the same time period.  Peer institutions were selected based on 
their similarity to the one-and-done institutions in the factors of total enrollment, number of 
sport teams, regular season winning percentage in men’s basketball, and annual athletic 
budget.  Every attempt was made to identify a peer institution that mirrored each one-and-
done institution as closely as possible. These peer institutions served as a control in the study. 
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 This was done in an attempt to determine if changes in the variables at one-and-done schools 
were due to external factors like inflation or economic trends instead of the presence of a 
one-and-done player. 
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Sample 
 The sample for this study included all NCAA division I men’s college basketball 
programs that have had a one-and-done player from 1995 to 2007 and their peer college 
basketball programs.  This period was selected because 1995 was the beginning of the trend 
for elite high school basketball players to bypass college basketball and enter the NBA Draft.  
In response to this trend, the NBA passed an age limit in 2006, which resulted in most of 
these players electing to play NCAA college basketball for one season before entering the 
NBA Draft.  The teams with one-and-done players during the 2007-2008 season were 
included in this study.  However, because there are currently no data on the season after the 
one-and-done player for these teams, this study only analyzed the differences in roster 
turnover at these schools. 
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Data Collection 
 The majority of the data were collected directly from the universities that have had 
one-and-done players and their peer universities.  An extensive search of the universities’ 
websites was conducted to determine teams’ on-court statistics.  When such searches did not 
yield the desired results, then the universities’ sports information offices were asked for the 
teams’ win-loss records, number of NCAA tournament games played, and the complete team 
roster for each season.  In order to determine teams’ winning percentages, the number of 
wins during a regular season was divided by the total games played during the same regular 
season.  For each season, a team’s roster was compared to the previous season’s roster.  The 
number of players on the current season’s roster that were not on the previous season’s roster 
was divided by the total number of players on the current season’s roster.  The resulting 
percentage was reported as the roster turnover for the current season. 
As needed, the universities’ ticket offices were asked for the teams’ season-ticket 
sales figures and their arena’s total capacity.  The season-ticket sales figure was divided by 
the number of home games to get the team’s average ticket sales of a home game.  The 
average ticket sales were then divided by the arena’s total capacity to determine the team’s 
attendance for the season (expressed in terms of percentage of capacity). 
Data concerning merchandise sales for each team were requested from the Collegiate 
Licensing Company and the universities themselves.  These data were reported in the study 
as a dollar amount for each team and each season pertaining to the study. 
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Data Reduction and Analysis 
 After the winning percentages, NCAA tournament games played, attendance, 
merchandise sales, and roster turnovers for all the seasons pertaining to one-and-done players 
since 1995 were collected, descriptive statistics were calculated to determine the mean of 
each variable in the seasons before, with, and after a one-and-done player.  The same was 
done for the peer institutions that served as the control for comparison.  These means were 
then analyzed using SPSS version 16.0 statistical software.  The two (Classification) by three 
(Year) repeated measures ANOVA output was used to determine if there was a significant 
difference between the winning percentages, NCAA tournament games played, ticket sales, 
merchandise sales, and roster turnovers of one-and-done schools and their peer schools in the 
seasons before, during, and after a one-and-done player.  When there was a significant 
difference between the one-and-done schools and their peers, Post Hoc testing was also run 
to determine exactly where the significant differences occurred.  To determine where the 
significant differences were between years at one-and-done schools, independent sample t-
tests were run.  To determine where the significant differences were between one-and-done 
schools and peer schools, paired samples t-tests were run.  Based on these results, the effects 
of one-and-done NCAA division I players on college basketball programs were concluded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS 
 
Winning Percentage 
This study found no significant difference in the regular season winning percentages 
of schools with a one-and-done player and the regular season winning percentages of peer 
institutions as the interaction effect for year (before, with, or after) by classification (one-
and-done or peer) was non-significant (F = .879, p-value = .418) (See Table 1).
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Table 1. 
          
 Regular Season Winning Percentage 
          
  
Season Before 
  
        
  Mean Median Range Std. Deviation 
          
One-And-Done Schools 65.28% 68.36% 27.59% to 93.10% 17.15% 
          
Peer Schools 61.23% 62.07% 30.00% to 86.21% 13.45% 
          
  Season With 
          
  Mean Median Range Std. Deviation 
          
One-And-Done Schools 70.40% 69.97% 32.14% to 96.77% 16.48% 
          
Peer Schools 65.34% 65.45% 37.04% to 87.10% 13.38% 
          
  Season After 
  
        
  Mean Median Range Std. Deviation 
          
One-And-Done Schools 65.95% 67.82% 34.62% to 93.55% 15.97% 
          
Peer Schools 64.92% 62.96% 37.04% to 90.32% 14.55% 
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NCAA Tournament Games Played 
This study a significant difference between the number of NCAA tournament games 
played for one-And-done schools and their peer institutions based on the interaction effect 
year (before, with, or after) by classification (one-and-done or peer) (F = 3.227, p-value = 
.043). 
Post Hoc paired samples t-tests revealed a significant difference occurred between the 
number of NCAA tournament games played by one-and-done schools for the season before 
and the season with a one-and-done player (t = 3.258, p-value = .003). 
Post Hoc independent samples t-tests showed a significant difference occurred 
between the one-and-done schools and peer schools for the number of NCAA tournament 
games played during the season “with” a one-and-done player (t = 3.055, p-value =.003). 
There was a disparity in the average number of NCAA games played for all three seasons 
between one-and-done schools and peer schools.  That disparity significantly increased for 
the season with a one-and-player.  (See Table 2) 
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Table 2.  
          
NCAA Tournament Games Played 
          
  Season Before 
          
  Mean Median Range Std. Deviation 
          
One-And-Done Schools 1.52 1.00 0 to 6 1.75 
          
Peer Schools 1.02 1.00 0 to 4 1.21 
          
  Season With 
          
  Mean Median Range Std. Deviation 
          
One-And-Done Schools 2.32 2.00 0 to 6 2.28 
          
Peer Schools 1.23 1.00 0 to 4 1.26 
          
  Season After 
          
  Mean Median Range Std. Deviation 
          
One-And-Done Schools 1.59 1.00 0 to 6 1.68 
          
Peer Schools 1.19 0.00 0 to 6 1.55 
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Attendance 
The interaction effect between year (before, with, or after) and classification (one-
and-done or peer) was non-significant for attendance (F = .852, p-value = .429).  In addition, 
there was found no significant difference in attendance of one-and-done institutions and peer 
institutions over the same time periods (See Table 3). 
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Table 3. 
          
Percentage of Capacity For All Home Games (Attendance) 
          
  Season Before 
          
  Mean Median Range Std. Deviation 
          
One-And-Done Schools 79.96% 81.07% 43.48% to 100.00% 15.82% 
          
Peer Schools 78.95% 82.19% 44.72% to 100.00% 16.05% 
          
  Season With 
          
  Mean Median Range Std. Deviation 
          
One-And-Done Schools 83.94% 86.01% 39.46% to 100.00% 14.08% 
          
Peer Schools 80.53% 83.85% 49.92% to 100.00% 14.43% 
          
  Season After 
          
  Mean Median Range Std. Deviation 
          
One-And-Done Schools 83.23% 87.79% 41.64% to 100.00% 15.03% 
          
Peer Schools 79.07% 80.03% 38.85% to 100.00% 16.69% 
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Merchandise Sales 
During data collection, the researcher was unable to obtain revenue figures for the 
Merchandise Sales variable.  This information was classified as confidential and neither the 
Collegiate Licensing Company (CLC) nor the schools themselves were willing to disclose 
their revenue figures.  The researcher then tried to use the CLC merchandise sales rankings to 
determine the relative impact of one-and-done players on Merchandise Sales.  However, 
because not all schools in the study are clients of the Collegiate Licensing Company, CLC 
rankings did not provide enough data to accurately judge changes in Merchandise Sales.  The 
data for all other variables were collected in accordance with the procedures described in 
Chapter III. 
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Roster Turnover 
This study found no significant difference between the percentage of new players on 
the rosters of one-and-done schools and the percentage of new players on the rosters of peer 
institutions (See Table 4).  Roster turnover was determined to be non-significant according to 
the interaction effect of year (before, with, or after) and classification (one-and-done or peer) 
(F = 2.685, p-value = .071).   
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Table 4.   
          
Percentage of New Players (Roster Turnover) 
          
  Season Before 
          
  Mean Median Range Std. Deviation 
          
One-And-Done Schools 38.47% 38.46% 20.00% to 66.67% 12.32% 
          
Peer Schools 40.13% 40.00% 14.29% to 66.67% 13.70% 
          
  Season With 
          
  Mean Median Range Std. Deviation 
          
One-And-Done Schools 40.81% 42.86% 15.38% to 66.67% 14.34% 
          
Peer Schools 34.68% 35.71% 7.14% to 64.29% 12.94% 
          
  Season After 
          
  Mean Median Range Std. Deviation 
          
One-And-Done Schools 41.59% 35.71% 15.38% to 86.67% 14.71% 
          
Peer Schools 33.51% 30.77% 0.00% to 53.85% 12.56% 
 
 
  
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
 
Summary 
 The purpose of this study was to determine the effect of one-and-done Division I 
basketball players on the success of college basketball programs both on and off the 
court.  Success was measured with four variables:  (a) regular season winning percentage, 
(b) number of NCAA Tournament games played, (c) attendance, reported as a percentage 
of total capacity, and (d) roster turnover.  To gauge the impact of a One-And-Done 
player, data were collected for developed variables for the season before, the season with, 
and the season after the player attended college.  Additionally, the same data were 
collected for a group of peer institutions with similar profiles.  This group of peer 
institutions was used as a control to help differentiate variance that resulted from factors 
others than the presence of a one-and-done player. 
 With the institution of the NBA Age Limit Rule in 2006, the best high school 
players were no longer eligible to enter the NBA draft in the year after they finished high 
school.  Since then, many have chosen to go to college for only one year and then enter 
the draft.  During that season, they do not play for millions of dollars, but ostensibly for 
the opportunity to obtain a college education while honing their basketball skills.  At the 
same time, the college athletic departments and the coaches for whom they play receive a 
premium player and all the benefits such an elite player provides. 
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 This study sought to investigate possible benefits a one-and-done player might 
bring to a NCAA men’s basketball program during the season he played and immediately 
he departed for the NBA.  Once these benefits have been determined and an investigation 
of whether such benefits accrue to a basketball program that obtains a one-and-done 
player, coaches and administrators may utilize such information to make informed 
decisions regarding their basketball program.  Quantifying the impact of one-and-done 
players in this study, may then make it possible for future research to consider issues like 
the compensation of student-athletes. 
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Discussion 
Research Question 1:  Is there a significant difference in the winning percentage of one-
and-done college basketball programs in the seasons before, with, or after a one-and-
done player’s career when compared to the winning percentage of peer institutions 
during the same seasons? 
 There is not a significant difference between the winning percentage of one-and-
done basketball programs in the season before, the season with, or the season after a one-
and-done player’s career.  Both one-and-done schools and peer schools saw a fairly large 
increase in winning percentage from the season before to the season with.  Both 
classifications of schools also saw a decrease in winning percentage from the season with 
to the season after.   
 There was an increase of about five percent for the season with a one-and-done 
player at one-and-done institutions. Winning more games could translate into gaining a 
bid to a postseason tournament, which in turn could generate more revenue for the one-
and-done basketball program and trigger performance bonuses in coaches’ contracts.  For 
example, Head Coach Jimmy Collins of the University of Illinois-Chicago receives a 
bonus of seven percent of his base salary in any year of his contract in which his team 
receives at at-large or automatic bid to the NCAA tournament (Board of Trustees, 2008).  
On average, the head coaches in the 2006 NCAA tournament made $800,000 annually 
(Wieberg, 2007, ¶5).  This could be a strong motivator for a coach, who is having trouble 
getting his team into the NCAA tournament, to recruit a one-and-done player who might 
be able to win help the team win 5 percent more games and qualify for the tournament.   
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 Research Question 2:  Is there a significant difference in the number of NCAA 
tournament games played by one-and-done college basketball programs in the seasons 
before, with, or after a one-and-done player’s career when compared to the number of 
NCAA tournament games played by peer institutions during the same seasons? 
 There is a significant difference in the number of NCAA tournament games 
played by one-and-done basketball programs during the season with a one-and-done 
player.  On average one-and-done schools play 0.75 more NCAA tournament games in 
the season with a one-and-done player than they do in the season before or the season 
after that player.  The same significant increase is not experienced by peer schools, who 
play significantly fewer NCAA tournament games than one-and-done schools during the 
“with” season.  These same peer schools do not play significant fewer NCAA tournament 
games than one-and-done schools during with the “before” or “after” seasons. 
 It is thereby concluded in this study, that a one-and-done player can help a college 
play 0.75 more NCAA tournament games for the season that he is on the team.  In 2008, 
the NCAA payout for each NCAA tournament game played was $206,020 (NCAA – 
Budget & Finances, 2008).  Therefore, a one-and-done player can minimally generate 
roughly $155,000 ($206,020 * .75) in NCAA payouts for his university and/or 
conference, depending on how the school’s conference divides NCAA revenues. 
 Coaches can also benefit financially from an extra NCAA tournament game.  
Again citing Coach Collins’ contract with the University of Illinois-Chicago, “The Coach 
will receive a seven percent bonus of base salary for each game the men’s basketball 
team wins in the NCAA tournament in any contract year” (Board of Trustees, 2008).  For 
Coach Collins, that means a $21,000 bonus for winning an NCAA tournament game.  
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This financial boost could be motivation to recruit one-and-done players, who 
significantly increase the number of NCAA games in which his team plays.  This type of 
performance bonus is common in coaching contracts and many of the bonuses are worth 
significantly more than Coach Collins’.  In 2008, Memphis and one-and-done player 
Derrick Rose lost the national championship game in the NCAA tournament to Kansas.  
If they had been victorious, Memphis Head Coach John Calipari would have earned a 
$400,000 bonus (Wieberg, 2007, ¶9).   
 While wins in the NCAA tournament can bring a coach immediate reward, they 
can also bring him long term financial security.  In 2007, six of the eight coaches who 
reached the NCAA tournament “Elite Eight” received contract extensions and earned an 
average increase of $322,000 in their annual salaries (Weiberg, 2007, ¶4).  Any coach 
looking for long-term job security, would be wise to consider this when he decides which 
high school players to recruit. 
 Recently, it has been speculated that Georgia Tech Head Coach Paul Hewitt saved 
his job by simply signing a probable one-and-done player, Derrick Favors. 
No NCAA tournament wins, one NCAA tournament appearance, and not 
even any NIT appearances, only add to the poor showing of the last three 
years. Barring a miracle this will be Hewitt’s third season out of four 
missing the NCAA’s, and it’s quite likely to be his third losing season out 
of the last four seasons.  It’s doubtful that Hewitt doesn’t finish this season 
though, as Georgia Tech’s head coach regardless of final record…has put 
together one of the best classes in America headed by consensus top five 
player Derrick Favors (Fann, 2009, ¶7). 
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This will not go unnoticed by other coaches on the hot seat.  Some may begin focusing 
their recruiting efforts on one-and-done players like Favors in a calculated attempt to 
save their jobs.   
To analyze the effect of one-and-done players on coaches’ tenure, one needs only 
to compare the average stay of coaches who have had a one-and-done player at their 
school to the average stay of coaches who have not had a one-and-done player at their 
school.  If coaches are recruiting one-and-done players in an attempt to save their own 
jobs, then it could be argued that they are completely disregarding the educational 
mission of the university itself.  The same allegations could be made of athletic directors 
and university presidents who hire coaches with a record of recruiting one-and-done 
players.  
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Research Question 3:  Is there a significant difference in the attendance at one-and-done 
college basketball programs in the seasons before, with, or after a one-and-done player’s 
career when compared to the attendance of peer institutions during the same seasons? 
 The differences in attendance at one-and-done schools and peer schools over the 
course of the study were found to be statistically non-significant.  At one-and-done 
schools, average attendance increased by almost four percent from the season before to 
the season with a one-and-done player.  During the same two year period, the sample of 
peer institutions experienced an increase of about 1.6 percent.  For the season after the 
one-and-done player, the one-and-done schools’ average attendance fell by 
approximately 0.71 percent.  The decrease in average attendance at peer schools was 
about 1.46 percent.   
 The increase in attendance coincided with an increase in roster turnover at one-
and-done schools.  This implies that findings of Kahane and Shmanske, which showed 
that increased roster turnover resulted in decreased attendance for Major League Baseball 
teams, do not apply to NCAA Division I college basketball.   
To further explore the effect of one-and-done players on attendance, the 
attendance figures for all peer institutions should be compiled.  Including all Division I 
schools would eliminate sampling error.  The statistics could then be run again to see if 
anything changed.  Future research could also attempt to see if one-and-done players can 
affect attendance through helping their team reach the NCAA tournament for the first 
time in a number of years.  If Rivers and Deschiver‘s study relating the number of years 
since a team’s last post season appearance to fan attendance in Major League Baseball is 
applicable to college basketball, then a program may experience an increase in attendance 
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in the season following its appearance in the NCAA tournament with the one-and-done 
player. 
Some may argue that if a one-and-done player is shown to have increased 
attendance and generated additional revenue for his university, then he will benefit 
financially when he enters the NBA.  The one-and-done player could receive 
endorsement deals because of his marketability.  The income from these endorsements 
could be seen as the one-and-done player’s earnings from playing Division I basketball, 
because his revenue-generation abilities would have been unknown if not for year he 
spent in college.  To test this theory, the average endorsement deals signed by one-and-
done players that entered the NBA should be compared to the average endorsement deals 
signed by high school players that entered the NBA.  These figures should be adjusted 
according to the inflation rate, so that the comparison will be more accurate.  If it is 
determined that one-and-done players get significantly more endorsement money than the 
high school players who by-passed college and went straight to the NBA, then it would 
strengthen the argument that one-and-done players receive more than just a one year 
scholarship for playing college basketball. 
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Research Question 4:  Is there a significant difference in the merchandise sales of college 
basketball programs in the seasons before, with, or after a one-and-done player’s career 
when compared to the merchandise sales of peer institutions during the same seasons? 
The answer to this question could not be determined because the institutions in 
this study wished to keep their merchandise sales figures confidential.  The researcher 
also attempted to use the Collegiate Licensing Company’s merchandise sales rankings to 
analyze this variable, but was unsuccessful because not all the schools in the study are 
clients of the CLC.  Future attempts to determine the impact of one-and-done players on 
merchandise sales could look at the footwear and apparel contracts that these players sign 
when they turn professional and compare them to those signed by other players coming 
out of college.  If the one-and-done players receive significantly more money, then it 
could be inferred that the apparel companies believe they will produce more revenue.  
The same may be true for the season these players spent in college basketball. 
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Research Question 5:  Is there a significant difference in the roster turnover of one-and-
done college basketball programs in the seasons before, with, or after a one-and-done 
player’s career when compared to the roster turnover of peer institutions during the 
same seasons? 
 It was found that there was no significant difference in roster turnover for the 
season before, the season with, or the season after a one-and-done player. Additionally, 
there was no significant difference between roster turnover at one-and-done schools and 
roster turnover at peer schools.  At one-and-done schools, roster turnover increased each 
season.  Conversely, roster turnover at peer schools decreased each season.  This could 
signal a trend of more players leaving college early at one-and-done schools.  It could 
also be that one-and-done schools have more NBA prospects and therefore players tend 
to leave school earlier.   
Athletic directors and university presidents at one-and-done schools may want to 
take a closer look at this.  Have their schools turned into a NBA training ground within an 
educational institution?  In an effort to answer this question, future researchers should 
continue to monitor the roster turnover at one-and-done schools.  If the percentage 
continues to increase to the point that there is a significant difference between roster 
turnover at one-and-done schools and peer schools, it may signal that these programs 
have replaced some of their student-athletes with only athletes. 
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Conclusions 
Of the five variables analyzed in this study, one-and-done players only had a 
statistically significant effect on the number of NCAA tournament games played.  
However, because the NCAA tournament is such an important part of college basketball, 
this study can still concludes that one-and-done players have a definitive positive on 
success in college basketball programs both on and off the court.  It has been shown that 
programs and coaches can both financially benefit from having a one-and-done player.  
When these benefits are compared directly to the value of the scholarship the player 
receives, it appears that the one-and-done players’ scholarships are not equitable 
compensation.  However, before this can be concluded it is recommended that future 
research be done to determine the impact that playing one year of college basketball has 
on a player’s marketability.  If one-and-done players receive significantly more 
endorsement money than their high school predecessors, then perhaps one-and-done 
players are eventually compensated for playing Division I college basketball. It is also 
recommended that future research be done to study the effect of one-an-done players on 
coaches’ compensation and tenure.  That study could potentially help further efforts to 
quantify the financial impact of one-and-done players on NCAA men’s Division I college 
basketball.
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Appendix A:  List of one-and-done players 
Season played One-And-Done player School 
1995-96 Stephon Marbury Georgia Tech 
1995-96 Shareef Abdul-Rahim California 
1996-97 Tim Thomas Villanova 
1997-98 Larry Hughes Saint Louis 
1997-98 Ricky Davis Iowa 
1998-99 Corey Maggette Duke 
1999-00 DerMarr Johnson Cincinnati 
1999-00 Donnell Harvey Florida 
1999-00 Jamal Crawford Michigan 
2000-01 Rodney White Charlotte 
2000-01 Gerald Wallace Alabama 
2000-01 Zach Randolph Michigan St. 
2000-01 Eddie Griffin Seton Hall 
2000-01 Alton Ford Houston 
2000-01 Omar Cook St. John's 
2001-02 Dajuan Wagner Memphis 
2001-02 Jamal Sampson California 
2002-03 Chris Bosh Georgia Tech 
2002-03 Carmelo Anthony Syracuse 
2003-04 Kris Humphries Minnesota 
2003-04 Luol Deng Duke 
2003-04 Trevor Ariza UCLA 
2004-05 Marvin Williams North Carolina 
2005-06 Shawne Williams Memphis 
2005-06 Tyrus Thomas LSU 
2006-07 Thaddeus Young Georgia Tech 
2006-07 Brandan Wright North Carolina 
2006-07 Greg Oden Ohio St. 
2006-07 Kevin Durant Texas 
2006-07 Javaris Crittenton Georgia Tech 
2006-07 Daequan Cook Ohio St. 
2006-07 Mike Conley Jr. Ohio St. 
2007-08 Bill Walker Kansas St. 
2007-08 Derrick Rose Memphis 
2007-08 Anthony Randolph LSU 
2007-08 O.J. Mayo Southern Cal 
2007-08 Kevin Love UCLA 
2007-08 Kosta Koufos Ohio St. 
2007-08 DeAndre Jordan Texas A&M 
2007-08 J.J. Hickson N.C. State 
2007-08 Donte Greene Syracuse 
2007-08 Eric Gordon Indiana 
2007-08 Michael Beasley Kansas St. 
2007-08 Jerryd Bayless Arizona 
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Appendix B:  List of peer institutions 
Year School Conference 
1995-96 Clemson ACC 
1995-96 Oregon PAC-10 
1996-97 St. John's BIG EAST 
1997-98 Charlotte C-USA 
1997-98 Wisconsin BIG TEN 
1998-99 Wake Forest ACC 
1999-00 Memphis C-USA 
1999-00 Kentucky SEC 
1999-00 Penn State BIG TEN 
2000-01 Saint Louis C-USA 
2000-01 Tennessee SEC 
2000-01 Minnesota BIG TEN 
2000-01 Providence BIG EAST 
2000-01 Marquette C-USA 
2000-01 Villanova BIG EAST 
2001-02 South Florida C-USA 
2001-02 Oregon PAC-10 
2002-03 Clemson ACC 
2002-03 Pittsburgh BIG EAST 
2003-04 Ohio State BIG TEN 
2003-04 Wake Forest ACC 
2003-04 Arizona State PAC-10 
2004-05 Maryland ACC 
2005-06 Alabama Birmingham C-USA 
2005-06 Tennessee SEC 
2006-07 Boston College ACC 
2006-07 Maryland ACC 
2006-07 Wisconsin BIG TEN 
2006-07 Kansas BIG 12 
2006-07 Boston College ACC 
2006-07 Wisconsin BIG TEN 
2006-07 Wisconsin BIG TEN 
2007-08 Oklahoma BIG 12 
2007-08 Alabama Birmingham C-USA 
2007-08 South Carolina SEC 
2007-08 Washington State PAC-10 
2007-08 Stanford PAC-10 
2007-08 Minnesota BIG TEN 
2007-08 Oklahoma BIG 12 
2007-08 Virginia ACC 
2007-08 Villanova BIG EAST 
2007-08 Purdue BIG TEN 
2007-08 Oklahoma BIG 12 
2007-08 Oregon PAC-10 
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